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This paper argues that challenges faced when implementing a nation brand can be better 
understood and visualised through a simulation approach.  A conceptual model of the collective 
learning process triggered by branding is formulated and its properties are investigated through a 
Monte Carlo simulation. The implications of the model are illustrated through two different 
branding projects in the Isle of Man: the Freedom to Flourish brand and the development of the 
Isle of Man International Tax Personality.  The paper shows that a successful nation branding 
project depends more on an effective management and support of a set of social dynamics 
processes rather than on formulating a brand statement accurately in the first place.  
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Finding a place within the modern global economy is a challenge for an island: cultural distance, 
physical distance, size, economic vulnerability are all potential hurdles to an island’s future 
economic viability (Briguglio et al., 2010; Baldacchino, 2010a, 2006; Briguglio, 1995).  This 
realisation has led many islands to invest in strategy formulation exercises in order to increase 
their economic competitiveness.  Nearly always in the last decade these economic and growth 
programmes have included nation branding projects.   
Country branding has a long history in international business research and can be traced back the 
discussion of 'Country-of-Origin' effects (Tan and Farley, 1987).  Country branding was initially 
concerned with product-country associations, i.e. the fact that a product could be perceived to be 
better not through the virtue of its own brand but also through its association with its country of 
origin.  Papadopoulos and Heslop (2002) conclude a 40 years review of the country branding 
literature by stating that 'country brands have built-in equity that individuals in various target 
markets develop over their lifetimes.  In some cases, such as those of Germany and Japan, this 
equity represents an asset of enormous value'. 
Genuine Jersey is an example, at an island level, of such a product-country brand: through 
adopting a strict code of values and quality indicators, Genuine Jersey has created value by 
increasing the willingness of customers to pay for island products labelled as authentic (Johnson, 
2012).  Customers can be islanders willing to pay more to proudly support their local economy 
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or visitors willing to pay more to return home with a unique memorabilia of their stay on the 
island. 
The branding process, though, did not stop with such product-country associations.  It eventually 
evolved to the branding of places (Grovers and Go, 2009).  This moved product-country 
branding to well defined target audiences towards service-country branding to more 
heterogeneous target audiences.  Finally, a further step in the generalisation of the scope of 
branding processes is nation branding (Fan, 2010),  a marketing exercise which involves a larger 
set of diverse stakeholders (including all of a nation's citizens) and a wider set of branding 
dimensions.  This paper is concerned with this level of scope where marketing processes, 
originally developed and tested for more clearly defined provisions (products or services), 
become 'branding for economic purposes' programmes.  Leseure (2010) links nation branding for 
economic purposes to the concept of economic self-discovery (Haussman and Rodrik, 2003), i.e. 
the ability of a nation to discover and learn what it is good at.  In other words, nation branding 
can be used as a mechanism by governments to create a social dynamics process where all 
citizens will engage in a critical evaluation of the relation between national identity with 
economic performance.   
Although this theory is seducing, it is not without its critics.  Papadopoulos and Heslop (2002) 
explain that country branding can fail because country brands statements are correct but are too 
broad and are not actionable.  Developing a nation brand is an ambitious exercise in public 
diplomacy as the number of stakeholders with possibly conflicting views on national identity can 
'backfire' and result in social tension or exclusion (Jansen, 2008).  Grydehøj (2008) warns of the 
risk of 'branding from above', i.e. the risk of treating nation branding as a classical 'top down' 
branding exercise, and provides the example of the Shetland archipelago where the branding 
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process failed to be aligned with Shetlanders' beliefs, and this despite conscious efforts to take 
into account the population's view at the outset of the project.  MacKrell (2013) reaches similar 
conclusions for the Isle of Man's Freedom to Flourish brand.  Finally, concerns have been raised 
in the nation branding literature regarding the risk of nation branding being undemocratic 
processes (Aronczyk, 2008; Jansen, 2008) as they tend to favour certain privileged ingroups at 
the expense of excluded outgroups. 
Between 2002 and 2012, nearly all island jurisdictions have engaged in some forms of nation 
branding and as a result, island branding has become a small but active stream of research.  Why 
have islands systematically embraced the idea of nation branding for economic purposes?  One 
argument is that countries that engage in country branding usually do so when they realise that 
their reputation is an impediment to economic affairs (Papadopoulos and Heslop, 2002), i.e. one 
considers nation branding when in economic trouble.  Another argument is that islands possess 
something unique, the 'island lure' (Baldacchino, 2010b), a unique intangible underlying country 
of origin equity, which should be released through a branding process for the sake of economic 
benefits.  Although successful examples exist (e.g. the product-country Genuine Jersey brand; 
Johnson, 2012) the literature reveals that most island branding initiatives have been ill-fated and 
have either resulted in generic brands all claiming to represent difference and uniqueness despite 
being fairly identical to one another (Leseure, 2010; Grydehøj, 2008) or partial rejection on the 
part of the local populations (MacKrell, 2013;  Grydehøj, 2008). 
In the light of this evidence, it would therefore appear that the criticisms of nation branding are 
well founded.  Does this means that the positive view of island branding as economic self-
discovery is either theoretically flawed or impractical?  To answer this question, we first need to 




March (1991) describes exploration as being associated with activities such as “search, 
variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, and innovation”.  Exploitation 
is associated with activities such as “refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, 
implementation, execution”.  The process of economic adaptation implies a need to learn, at the 
island level, which economic activities to develop, invest in, utilise, or terminate.  Economic 
actors on islands have to balance activities dealing with the exploration of new ideas with the 
exploitation of known processes and business models. March (1991) demonstrates that because 
adaptive processes refine exploitation more rapidly than innovation, they can help organisations 
to become very effective in the short-run but do so at the cost of compromising or “self-
destructing” long run economic prospects. 
A central question in this paper is how do islands learn about what they are good at and which 
sectors they should invest in?  Thus, a critical question for island economy scholars should be 
how islands fare with the execution of explorative and exploitative processes in the conduct of 
their economic affair.  Consistently with March's (1991) concern about over-reliance on 
exploitation, the question above includes asking whether or not island economies are at risk of 
suffering from focusing on exploitation at the expense of exploration?   
When trying to avoid the evolutionary “dead-end” that this scenario would create, only 
exploration activities can help an island to move away from known configurations and develop 
viable economic configurations for the future.  When studying island entrepreneurship (a 
mechanism for exploration), Baldacchino (2005a, 2005b) highlights the importance of strong 
island brands.  Similarly, the topic of this paper is to study the mutual dependency between 
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branding and learning at an island level.  A review of the collective learning and branding 
literature suggests that four important dimensions should be considered: 
 the distinction between learning from the brand and learning by the brand; 
 the distinction between brand and identity; 
 the importance of political processes; and 
 the importance of psychological defences. 
Brands and Learning 
It is thanks to a strong brand that customers, investors, and entrepreneurs make economic 
decisions consistent with the overall strategy of an island (learning from the brand) in a 
behavioural process akin to conditioning. Conversely, it is through the cumulative process of 
investing in activities that “one is good at” that island brands can be created and built upon 
(learning by the brand).   
Through a brand diagnostic tool, Leseure (2010) shows how island officials display a tendency 
to exploit known islands business models rather than explore new ones when promoting an 
island for touristic purposes.  Moreover, through a simulation of island learning based on 
March’s (1991) model, Leseure (2010) shows how diluted brands block the potential for the 
discovery of relevant but non-branded dimensions.  Brands which are accurately featuring salient 
characteristics of an island but are not overly prescriptive, conversely, leave room for exploration 
and permit economic self-discovery.  In other words, in the branding attempt to set island 
identity lies both a strength (the ability to unite and guide behaviour) and a weakness (the risk of 
incurring cognitive dissonance between the brand and reality). 
7 
 
Brand and Identity 
An island brand is the initial brand specification set by a party with the power to do so.  
Typically, in the case of an island, this party will be the local government.  Island identity, in 
contrast, is an aggregation of collective beliefs.  Whereas an island brand is a specification at a 
point in time, an island identity is a dynamic, evolving entity.  Its underlying values may or may 
not be aligned with the brand, and may or may not be internally consistent.  March’s (1991) 
collective learning model provides the capability to simulate over time how stakeholders react to 
a brand, and how their identity beliefs evolve.  
The Importance of Political Processes 
Rodrigues and Child (2008) note that a vast majority of authors adopt a definition of identity as 
something central and enduring.  Rodriguez and Child argue that one of the limitations of the 
identity literature is to treat as apolitical what is in actual fact a politically charged topic (2008).  
Dissent, conflicting views, coalitions, the use of rhetoric, and references to overriding national 
identity values are a few examples of issues which will necessarily intervene within the 
elaboration of an island brand.  Instead of appreciating fully these rich dynamics of political 
processes at play, a traditional marketing approach to branding prefers to smooth edges and to 
formulate a politically neutral or flexible, and therefore potentially vague, brand.  
Rodrigues and Child (2008) highlight the importance of mobilisation, the extent to which a party 
will fight for a brand.  Mobilisation can be material: for example, a government may offer 
interest-free commercial loans to entrepreneurs in order to stimulate a country brand based on 
innovation and creativity.  Thus, by observing if a party allocates budgets and effectively 
supports certain ventures, one can measure the degree of mobilisation for a brand.  Mobilisation 
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can also be ideational: in this case, a practice or idea is not supported financially or materially 
but through positive feedback, career prospects, opportunities, recognition, etc.  Mobilisation, 
however, can also be a strong opposing view to the brand, in which case it is more accurately 
described as counter-mobilisation.   
Rodrigues and Child (2008) also show that legitimacy is an important variable during the 
development of an identity.  Ideas and values promoted by influential parties are more likely to 
be adopted by followers and less likely to be challenged.  Accounting for legitimacy can simply 
be done by considering different stakeholders with different decisional weights and mobilisation 
factors.   
Psychological Defences 
The collective learning literature acknowledges the fact that learning is affected by identity, 
which is often a constraint that blocks organisations from changing due to individual and 
organisational self defences.  This psychodynamic perspective is described extensively by Brown 
and Starkey (2000) who discuss five (out of a potential list of fifty) defence identity mechanisms 
that can block learning: 
 Denial is the immediate rejection of an idea and the refusal to even consider it.   
 Rationalisation is the artificial and incorrect reconciliation of two conflicting 
views in order to avoid having to modify one’s identity.   
 Idealisation is the process of over-valuing and augmenting a value or idea to the 
extent that it cannot possibly be challenged.   
 Fantasy is the pursuit of substitutive satisfactions in contexts where seeking 
satisfaction is premature or impossible.   
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 Finally symbolisation is the use of symbols to encourage individuals to maintain 
their self-esteem and conceal unconscious thoughts.  For example, oil companies 
advertising themselves as “green” companies can be said to adopt a symbol 
encouraging employees to adopt this identity and not to investigate deeper. 
These defences can be countered by creating a context conducive to exploration.  Brown and 
Starkey (2000) highlight the importance of the willingness to explore and openness to debate 
between stakeholders in this respect.   
Methodology 
Island economic self-discovery supported through a nation branding is, according to the previous 
section, theoretically possible.  To understand why such an initiative would succeed or fail 
requires looking into the exact mechanisms and processes through which reflections, debates and 
learning take place.  These mechanisms are often overlooked within the branding literature as it 
focuses on marketing frameworks that fail to account for the socio-technical systems at stake 
(McKrell, 2013).  Consistently with Erdem and Sun (2002), this paper argues that a simulation 
approach is ideal to study branding processes and to address the above challenges.  A simulation 
approach allows the investigator to focus on the complex and collective forms of interactions that 
take place within a segmented, and potentially fragmented, set of stakeholders involved in 
identity construction.  Marney and Tarbet (2000) explain that as a methodology a simulation 
approach permits the examination that a multiple set of micro-level processes (e.g. learning 
about the brand through a social encounter, shaping a new brand when leading by example) have 
on macro-level results (the acceptance or rejection of a brand). 
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Through a simulation model of island learning, it is possible to simulate what happens to a brand 
when it is released to an island's population whilst taking into account the different factors 
discussed in the previous section (propensity to explore, political processes, etc.).  This model is 
used to simulate real-life branding cases (the Isle of Man Freedom to Flourish and the Isle of 
Man International Tax Personality).  The simulation results are used to discuss whether or not 
economic self-discovery through branding is possible and to explore the socio-dynamics issues 
that are involved.  
Simulation Model Development 
The purpose of this section is to formalise a simulation model of collective learning based on 
March’s (1991) initial formulation but extended in order to accommodate the political and 
identity variables discussed in the previous section. 
A network of economic actors  made up of n individuals, or groups of individuals, (denoted by 
indice i) have beliefs regarding an external reality.  This external reality is independent of beliefs 
about it and actors attempt, through learning processes, to discover which beliefs are more useful 
to them.  Consistently with March (1991) this external reality is assumed to have m dimensions 
and is represented by an ordained set of binary values.  Thus, external reality is an m-tuple {rj}, j= 
1..m, with each rj  value indicating that a characteristic is useful/productive (rj = 1) or 
useless/unproductive (rj  = 0). 
Let us consider for example a country concerned about the impact that university graduates 
possessing mathematical skills have on competitiveness.  An r-value of 0 would indicate that 
holding such skills will have no impact on the competitiveness of the country whereas a value of 
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1 would suggest that producing mathematics graduate will improve the competitiveness of the 
country. 
It is likely that readers of this journal would agree with the view that '1' is more likely to be the 
external reality than '0' in the example above, but it would be presumptuous to state that such  a 
view is a universal one.  It is important to appreciate that it is not within the scope of this paper 
to debate the nature of the external reality (the factors generating economic competitiveness) for 
islands.  The focus of this paper is instead on the ability of the economic actors to discover the 
external reality through collective learning (i.e. the process of economic self-discovery). 
An official branding campaign plays a role in this process.  It is represented by the official island 
brand, {cj}, j=1..m and is defined by government officials or another group of individuals in power.  
Although an official brand could match the best values {rj}, the simulation focuses on the not-so-
ideal (but more realistic) case where some branding suggestions do not match the reality set (in 
other words, the discovery of a better brand is possible).  Once a brand code {cj} is released to 
individuals, they collectively have the capacity to change this code.  Thus, {cj} initially 
represents a formulated brand and, once released and interacted with, it represents a collective 
identity.  
 Each individual will have their own beliefs regarding the identity dimensions.  These beliefs are 
recorded in matrix {bi,j}, i=1..n, j=1..m.  Individuals' beliefs evolve and are not necessarily aligned 
with the official code {cj} at each point in time: instead individual have the opportunity to 
change their belief to the official view but they can also change the official view. 
This two-way interaction with the code (i.e. the brand) is consistently with March (1991).  
Collective learning is broken down into two steps that are iterated many times.  A learning 
iteration starts with learning from the code: at this stage, individuals are given a chance to update 
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their beliefs so they match the collectively agreed-upon brand (for the first iteration) or identity 
(for further iterations).  Each individual's i  belief regarding dimension j, bi,j, is compared with 
the brand value cj.   If  bi,j = cj, the individual keeps his/her belief.  If, however, the individual’s 
belief is different than the brand value, the simulation generates a random number.  If this 
number is less than a threshold value p1, then the individual’s belief is updated to cj.  p1 is a 
variable measuring exploitative tendency in society: high values show a marked preference for 
following a brand recommendation instead of crafting a unique strategy for economic success.   
The second step within an iteration is learning by the code.  The simulation surveys all 
individual beliefs and flags the individual(s) with the highest match with the reality values {rj}.  
We assume that these economic actors, having discovered a successful economic strategy, will 
be noted in society for their success and thus, that their views will have gained legitimacy.  We 
take these entrepreneurs' average beliefs, and for each dimension j, allow a chance p2 of the 
collective brand code {cj} to be updated to the average belief.  p2 is a variable measuring 
exploration capabilities in society: high values highlight a natural tendency to explore 
alternatives and to innovate. 
Because the development of an island identity is a political matter, it is essential to account for 
the mobilisation of the different stakeholders.  A mobilisation variable {mi,j} for each individual 
and each branding dimension is used.  This variable can take values between +1 (full 
mobilisation) and -1 (full counter-mobilisation). 
Mobilisation for the brand/identity affects learning through the p1 and p2 learning parameters and 
P1 and P2 represents the adjusted learning parameters.  If mobilisation is high for an issue j, then 
all parties within an economy will be willing to adopt the brand and engage in exploitation.  
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Exploration, which looks for alternative ideas, is discouraged by high mobilisation.  This is 
captured in the two equations shown below: 
  
        




        
      
 
  
In order to further account for the psychodynamic aspects of identity construction, a defence 
factor is required.  As the initial brand statement is an official “government” brand, defence 
factors are only applied to the government as a stakeholder.  Thus, a set of m {dj} values is used 
to indicate the extent to which a government will be highly defensive of the brand.  Defence 
values range from 0 (non defensive position) to 1 (very defensive position).  The adjusted 
learning parameters become: 
  
        
      
 
     
 
  
        
      
 
                  
 
  
        
      
 
           
 
The equations above show that high defences result in favouring exploitation whereas 
exploration is penalised (p2 becomes 0 if dj=1).  In the case where a party is counter-mobilised 




As the government that initially introduces a brand is likely to defend it, the impact of defence 
factors can be countered by a willingness to explore {Wi} and openness to debate {Opi}.  The 
willingness to explore is assumed to be a simple linear function from 0 (no willingness to explore 
at all) to 1 (a very strong willingness to explore).  In the case of the openness variable, it is 
assumed to be a progressively accelerating condition that is better represented by a sigmoid 
function: 
             
 
       
 
 
Opj is a real number representing openness. Very negative values, e.g. -10, are used to indicate a 
complete reluctance to engage in dialogue.  It results in an openness score close to 0.  Large 
positive values indicate openness to dialogue and result in a score of 1. 
These last two variables are incorporated in the model as follows: 
  
  
        
      
 
       
   
 
   
 
    
         
 
  
        
       
 
       
 
   
            
 
           
  
        
       
 
       
 




These equations show that openness to dialogue is considered to moderate mobilisation.  If a 
government is very closed to dialogue around a policy issue, it is likely that controversy will 
surround the implementation of this policy and that even the best material and ideational 
supports will not be enough to sustain the initiative.   
Willingness to explore  is used to directly counter the impact of the defence factor.  Note that the 
willingness factor directly affects p2 (exploration) positively, whereas high willingness scores 
tend to decrease exploitation tendencies. 
In order to run this model as a simulation, all that is needed is two randomly generated numbers 
pt and pl (for exploitation and exploration respectively) which are respectively compared with the 
adjusted forms of p1 and p2 at each iteration.  This means that the model can be operated as 
Monte Carlo simulation, as initially done by March (1991).  A Monte Carlo simulation is a 
computational algorithm where variables with unknown probability distributions are randomly 
simulated (through the generation of a random number) in order to study their impacts on the 
behaviour or properties of a system after many iterations.  In the model described above, pt and 
pe are randomly generated to simulate the real-life interactions of economic actors in an island 
economy.  If pt<p1 at one iteration, we simulate the case of an actor adopting and accepting the 
brand and modifying his or her economic behaviour accordingly.  If pl < p2, we simulate the case 
where a number of successful entrepreneurs have managed to influence societal beliefs as the 
island identity changes to recognise and promote new success stories. 
Method 
March's (1991) simulation was originally applied to a set of m=30 reality dimensions and n=50 
individuals to study an artificial case of organisational learning over 80 iterations.  Island 
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learning is obviously different in scale than organisational learning for 50 employees.  As the 
reality dimensions are interdependent in the simulation algorithm when learning from the code 
takes place, the simulation results and the stochastic fluctuations reported will be quantitatively 
sensitive to different values of m.  Similarly, the quantitative results and stochastic fluctuations 
are sensitive to n: for example a small group can come with less variety in views, and thus the 
probability to discover reality is decreased.  Sensitivity to m and n would matter if the objective 
were to study the speed of learning the best identity for economic purposes.  March (1991) points 
out however that the qualitative results of the simulation (i.e. can the best identity be 
discovered?) is insensitive to the values and m and n.   It is the number of iterations performed 
that is important to consider when one to investigate economic self-discovery capability.  
Through a process of trial and errors with draft simulations runs, it was established that in order 
to see a convergence of identity towards a stable state, 100 iterations were sufficient. 
The two case studies which are used to run simulations are two different branding exercises that 
took place in the Isle of Man: the Freedom to Flourish entrepreneurial brand and the 
development of the Isle of Man International Tax Personality.   The first case is based on the 
promotion of four key values said to significantly contribute to the ability of the island to 
improve its economic competitiveness (these are described in more details later in the case study 
section).  The second case, the Isle of Man International Tax Personality, can coincidentally be 
summarised in 4 dimensions. Thus, for the two simulations to be performed, m=4. 
The determination of n is different than the initial formulation by March (1991) as a nation 
branding exercise will typically target a fragmented society rather than a more uniform set of 
employees.  As the qualitative results are insensitive to n, we set n=20 to reduce computational 
load but breakdown these 20 individuals, or groups of individuals, into 4 categories: government 
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officials, the Manx core population (defined as individuals born Manx or born of Manx parents), 
other residents (work immigrants working in the Isle of Man with a Manx work permit), and 
outsiders (parties linked to the Isle of Man through trade or diplomacy and in a position to 
influence identity construction).  Each category is likely to have different views of the brand at 
the outset of the collective learning process.  By changing the number of individuals in each 
category, it is possible to assign weights to the voice of each of these four categories.  The choice 
of these 4 categories was made to provide an accurate picture of the stakeholders in the case of 
the Isle of Man: its population is made up of 50% Manx and 50% other work residents, and 
Manx vs. non-Manx divergences of opinions is a common feature of Manx public life and 
debates.  As the branding of the Isle of Man also targets wealthy outside investors whose 
economic decisions strongly affect the island, the simulation was designed to give these 
individuals an important voice, despite the fact that there are demographically a very small 
number.  The same argument applied to government officials and thus the n=20 individuals are 
divided into 4 equal groups in order to simulate the interaction between these 4 equally 
influential voices. 
In order to run these simulations, all variables and parameters values are based on a realistic 
assessment of the branding experiences of the Isle of Man.  The definition of the numerical 
values (e.g. a party's openness or defence of the brand) required are either derived from 
observations (and are therefore estimates) or from empirical work performed about perceptions 
of Isle of Man brands (McKrell, 2013).  The reality quadruples are decisions made by the author 
for the sake of providing a realistic illustration.  As explained earlier on, the simulation purpose 
is not to debate whether these reality values are accurate but to assess the ability of a group to 
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collectively learn them.  Therefore, neither their indicative meaning nor the assumed values 
affect the conclusions reached from running the simulation.   
Case Studies 
Freedom to Flourish 
The Freedom to Flourish brand is the result of a government initiative with the aim of 
formulating a high level brand statement derived from the unique identity of the Isle of Man.  As 
such, it is a typical example of a marketing approach which is informed by national identity 
considerations.  The freedom to flourish brand is described as the island’s competitive identity in 
a government publication entitled Economic and Social Development through the Enhancement 
of the National Identity of the Isle of Man.  The key values making up the brand are : 
Independent thinking 
 We will develop our distinctive culture and heritage and encourage greater use of 
the Manx language. 
 We value our independence as a country, and aim to enhance it. 
 We will carve our own path, pragmatically, with agile and imaginative 
legislation, and skilful negotiation with other countries and organisations. 
 We value people as individuals, and celebrate their differences. 
 We have a great heritage of creativity and innovation, and will ensure this 
continues. 
Resilience 
 We will be courageous in bad times, and avoid complacency in good times. 
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 We will be resourceful in adapting to change and developing new opportunities. 
 The Three Legs of Man symbolises our resilience. 
 We will protect our environment and natural beauty. 
Resourcefulness 
 We will be receptive to good ideas. 
 We will work together across a wide range of interest groups. 
 We will encourage co-operation between public and private sector. 
Community loyalty (helping others flourish) 
 We will buy Manx products and services wherever possible 
 We will do our best to promote the Isle of Man and its values to the outside world 
 We will celebrate the Island’s successes and give everyone the opportunity to 
share in them 
 We will welcome visitors and new residents alike to the Island 
(Key values from Isle of Man Government, 2006, pp. 23/24) 
Table 1 displays the simulation parameters and results.  The top row shows that the assumed 
reality quadruple is (0,1,1,0) meaning that resilience and resourcefulness are assumed to be 
national identity traits consistent with the economic history of the island and traits that would 
indeed improve economic competitiveness and entrepreneurial spirit in the Isle of Man.  The two 
nil values are here to indicate that the independent thinking and the community loyalty are more 
controversial as they contain protectionist and possibly self-serving socially excluding messages 
that not fit well an island economy whose survivals depends on working within a global 
economy.  This hypothetical reality quadruple is used to underline potentially controversial 
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elements of the brand, as for example the ideas that the use of the Manx language will stimulate 
economic growth, that imaginative legislation may be perceived by many as controversial 
legislation, or that the track record of the island may be more about exploitation than exploration.  
The question behind the simulation is, given the parameters, what will be the resulting collective 
identity after several learning iterations? 
 The left hand side column shows the initial beliefs of each stakeholder: for example, the 
government promotes a brand coded as (1 1 1 1), i.e. an unconditional acceptance of the four 
dimensions listed above.  Note, however, that different stakeholders start with different beliefs, 
as for example other work residents who are strongly critical of the realism of the first 3 
statements and neutral regarding the fourth one.   It is also important to highlight that the reality 
quadruple (0,1,1,0) differs from the brand statement and from all other starting beliefs.   
  
((( Insert table 1 around here ))) 
 
The third row in table 1 represents the government attitude towards their brand statement: the 
extent to which they are defensive of a brand statement, willing to explore alternative values, and 
open to dialogue.  For example, table 1 shows that the Manx government is very defensive of the 
independent thinking value (d1=1), not very willing to explore alternatives (w1=0.1), and closed 
to dialogue (Op1=-10). 
The central matrix displays the mobilisation coefficient, i.e. the support that different 
stakeholders are likely to provide to a value statement.  Negative figures indicate counter-
mobilisation.  For example, the Manx core population is very keen to support independent 
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thinking as a core value (m2,1= 1) whilst the other residents are counter-mobilised (m3,1=-1), fact 
which represents the Manx/non-Manx tensions discussed previously. 
There are many parameters in table 1 and it is impossible, in the interest of space, to discuss all 
the decisions that were made.  These decisions can however be summarised in terms of the 
learning blocks and psychodynamic defences that they create in the terminology of Brown and 
Starkey (2000).  The Freedom to Flourish case illustrates the use of a brand for symbolisation 
purposes: the island is described as unique and original (statement 1), resourceful and resilient 
(statements 2 and 3), and kind and fair (4).  This very positive message clashes with the 
fragmented and often cynically adversarial nature of Manx public and economic life.  As a result, 
the brand attempts to rationalise conflicting dimensions as consistent (in statements 1 and 4) and 
idealise certain values (for example the promotion of the Manx language could be defended on 
cultural grounds but it is difficult to see its value in a brand designed to improve economic 
competitiveness).  As a result of symbolisation, rationalisation, and idealisation the reaction of 
some stakeholders is denial as for example the outright rejection of statements of independent 
thinking by other residents (b3,1= -1, m3,1= -1).   
 The results at the bottom of table 1 show that the psychodynamic and political assimilation of 
the Freedom to Flourish brand is a difficult matter as the resulting collective identity never 
results in the discovery of the reality quadruple.  The independent thinking value statement is 
systematically rejected, and this despite the government defence of this dimension (it is only 
accepted in some instances if the learning climate is assumed to very exploitative -p1=0.8- but 
this is not a stochastically stable result.  Resilience and resourcefulness are systematically 
accepted as valid identity constructs, and this despite the initial resistance of some parties.  
Community loyalty is not rejected (when it should) due to government defence and the strong 
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cumulative voice of stakeholders than this statement serves.  This is an example of a rationalised 
brand value that can persist because of psychodynamic learning blocks.  It is only if the 
willingness to explore options and the open to dialogue are increased that this reality dimension 
is discovered adequately.    
This simulation illustrates the danger of “rationalised” brands, where the desire to finalise a best 
of breed brand statement may actually fuel controversy and block economic self-discovery.  The 
results are well aligned with the real life Freedom to Flourish brand.  McKrell (2013) provides a 
detailed case study of the elaboration and evolution of the brand and confirms that substantial 
rationalisation took place.  She also documents through a survey negative perceptions of the 
government in relation to the development and management of the brand.  An interview with one 
of the project managers in charge of the implementation of the brand revealed that a decision was 
made to lower the brand visibility as it was attracting considerable criticisms from many 
stakeholders.      
The Isle of Man International Tax Personality 
The Isle of Man economy is greatly dependent on its offshore finance sector.  The offshore 
financial sector has been under threat for many years given the resolution of many developed 
economies and international institutions (United States, OECD, United Nations) to get rid of 'tax 
havens' (Hampton, 2002).  There is much debate and controversy around the overall economic 
impact that tax havens have on non tax-havens.  A common argument is that tax havens divert 
economic activity and have negative consequences on non tax-havens.  This for example the 
view expressed in the European Parliament Report (2013) concluding that tax havens constrains 
the EU budget and undermines the fiscal recovery of EU Member States, with a particular 
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concern for the unfair advantages of large companies engaging in tax-avoidance through transfer 
pricing mechanisms. Desai et al. (2006)  challenge this commonly held view and demonstrate 
through modelling and empirical evidence that tax havens do not divert economic activity but in 
fact enhance activity in non-havens.  Similar welfare effects of tax havens for non tax havens 
residents are reported by Hong and Smart (2007). 
Beside transfer pricing, a key issue with tax havens is their possible involvement with money 
laundering activities and obstruction to the assessment of taxes by non-tax havens governments. 
The underlying concern here is about secrecy and willingness to collaborate with other tax 
authorities.   Many countries and international organisations have prepared black lists of tax 
havens.  An example is the FATF blacklist, prepared by the intergovernmental organisation 
Financial Action Task Force of the G7 member states.  This list contains countries with 
significant strategic deficiencies and that pose a risk to the international financial system.  As of 
June 2013, this list contains 14 countries.    The OECD also maintains a black list of 
uncooperative countries ('the list of uncooperative tax havens').  Seven jurisdictions were initially 
included in the black list and all have taken actions to address the issues highlighted by the 
OECD.  By 2009, all jurisdictions had been removed from the black list (OECD, 2014).  The 
OECD also maintains a 'gray list' of jurisdictions of special interest that examines to what extent 
these jurisdictions comply with international tax regulations.  The Isle of Man was initially listed 
on the OECD gray list and was removed from it in 2009 and moved to a 'white' list (Gravelle, 
2013).  
When a jurisdiction depends heavily on the offshore finance sector, the controversy surrounding 
tax heavens mean that quality of governance and reputation are key for survival.  The Isle of 
Man has actively managed its reputation as an independent tax jurisdiction and its collaboration 
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with international tax authorities.  As such, it is a perfect illustration of Dharmapala and Hines' 
(2006) conclusion, supported by empirical evidence, that better-governed countries are likely to 
become tax havens.   
As part of its reclassification effort from the OECD 'gray' to the 'white' list, the Isle of Man has 
actively branded its tax identity and tax officials were asked to report and present their views on 
the development of the Isle of Man International Tax Personality.   This personality is based on 
the principle that as a small island, its governance is more efficient than large countries and thus 
that it can legitimately afford lower tax rates.  Lower tax rates in an offshore location are not 
necessarily an “avoidance” of rules; instead there are branded as a sovereign right to tax resident 
entities at levels which are suitable given local economic conditions.  This is shown as the first 
identity dimension in table 2. 
 
((( Insert table 2 around here ))) 
 
Table 2 also show the other three reality dimensions: a fair benchmark should be established to 
adequately compare tax competitiveness (statement 2), tax collaboration through international 
treaties is essential (statement 3), and the competitiveness of an island can be derived from 
genuine competence rather than solely from low tax rates (statement 4). 
As the Isle of Man International Tax Personality is a very outward facing brand, we consider 4 
stakeholders. The government promotes statements 1, 3, and 4 consistently with the tax haven 
literature whereas it rejects dialogue around the issue of fairness. International investors are 
initially neutral about all dimensions as their objective is optimal tax planning.  International 
organisations are initially more interested in fairness and competence issues as well as treaties 
25 
 
but are not convinced by the argument of effective governance as a source of competitive 
advantage.  Finally, the general public tend to hold a negative view of tax havens despite 
typically little involvement with them. 
Table 2 shows the example of an initially much more accurate brand than Freedom to Flourish.  
The only branding controversy is around the second statement related to fairness which is a 
debate that the government is not willing to engage in (d2= 1, w2=0.1, Op2= -10).  The underlying 
issue in this case study are opposing denials from different parties.  On one hand, the Isle of Man 
government and investors refuse to consider fairness issues.  On the other hand international 
organisations (representing coalitions of non tax havens) and the general public refuse to accept 
the governance effectiveness argument.  
As the central issue in this simulation is the ability to discover statement 2  (fairness) it is good to 
illustrate the nature of the issue with an example.  The competitiveness argument (statement 1) is 
that smaller jurisdictions are more efficient at governance and thus can afford lower tax rates that 
they can legitimately offer to international investors.  The Isle of Man is surrounded by non tax 
haven countries that have adopted stringent and expensive regulations regarding the treatment of 
sewer water.  As a sovereign entity, the Isle of Man simply discharges its sewers in the Irish Sea.  
Should the definition of effective governance between tax havens and non tax havens include 
criteria regarding the fairness of comparison?  If so, Isle of Man would to have to adopt the same 
pollution control regulations than its neighbours, and its government budget may be significantly 
affected and its a share of its competitive advantage derived from 'effective' governance would 
be eroded.    
Table 2 shows that the brand proposition and the combination of defence, willingness, and 
openness factors are such that acceptance of the tax brand as an identity is not challenged even in 
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contexts where exploration is high.  This finding can be interpreted by the fact that in table 2, the 
proposed brand is quite accurate, and thus, the government benefits from an expert status in 
terms of “hiding” the second variable.   
When willingness is set to 1 and openness to +10, surprisingly exploitation gives better results 
than exploration.  This can be simply explained: the government has only to accept one change 
in code for dimension 2 before the entire set of beliefs converges.  When exploration is high, 
acceptance of this new belief is not systematic.   
This contrasting set of results around the ability to discover the truth about statement 2 
demonstrates that through the adequate use of psychodynamic defences, branding officials can 
promote messages that are in their interest: as such, nation branding can be said to share 
commonalities with propaganda. 
Conclusion 
Simulation has not been a conventional way of studying branding processes, with only one 
research paper (Erdem and Sun, 2002) using such an approach previously.  The case study 
presented in this paper suggest that simulation is in fact a promising avenue to better understand 
the complex processes and stakeholders interactions involved in nation branding.  This is a 
promising field for research, as this paper and its only predecessor (Erdem and Sun, 2002) are 
both based on simple Monte Carlo simulations.  It is likely that more modern approaches such as 
agent-based simulation (Railsback et al., 2006) offer exciting opportunities to develop further the 
work presented in this paper. 
Starting with a simulation of island learning used to study how individuals react to a brand 
statement and socially construct their own identities, this paper formulates a full model of 
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identity learning where the formation of an identity is moderated by psychological defences, 
mobilisation, legitimacy, the willingness to explore, and openness to dialogue.  This simulation 
model is used to run two simulations: The Freedom to Flourish entrepreneurial brand is an 
example of an idealised and rationalised branding project which was not successful and the Isle 
of Man International Tax Personality is an example of a more successful branding project and 
this, despite the existence of underlying controversies, with branding dynamics involving 
opposing denials of different dimensions of the brand amongst stakeholders. 
Whereas previous research (Leseure, 2010) argued that the only impediment to island economic 
self-discovery through branding was the propensity of islands to overly rely on exploitation, the 
case studies used in this paper shows cases where even if the ability to explore is artificially 
simulated, economic self-discovery will still fail because of political and psychodynamic 
variables.  Instead of conceptualising an island branding exercise as a marketing activity, policy 
makers should consider island branding as an exercise that goes beyond the mere definition of a 
static 'top down' brand statement and that involves the long term management of a collective 
process of identity construction that not will only result in economic betterment but also in more 
social cohesion.  What matters is not to find the best brand statement (although this is clearly 
desirable!) but to avoid brands that are idealised and rationalised and that can only be promoted 
through strong defences and a lack of dialogue.  In the worst case scenario, cynicism from all 
parties can built up over time and negate the value of an investment that was otherwise a valid 
public policy choice.   
All island brands reported to have failed partially or completely in the literature have all included 
at the beginning of their branding project numerous interviews and surveys about local 
perceptions of national identity.  All these projects have been commissioned with the explicit 
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promise by the branding consultants that the local population views would be taken into account.  
Yet, none of these projects delivered the expected benefits.  This is because one's opinion about 
national identity and of the future of an island economy is only an initial input of the nation 
branding process.  It is a necessary variable to start the branding process but not a sufficient 
variable to explain how the same individual will interact with the brand several months or years 
later, when the brand itself will have evolved.  In other words, it is not the initial brand statement 
that really matters (as it can and will change), but it the social dynamics process of interaction 
that could make a nation branding exercise successful. 
The model developed in this paper could be used by policy makers to focus more on the process 
and less on the brand by conducting scenario analyses of the different stakeholders both in terms 
of their beliefs and of how these beliefs will interact with a brand statement.  This could result in 
the adoption of more flexible and robust brands that genuinely open the way for economic self-
discovery. 
References 
Aronczyk, M. (2008) "Living the Brand: nationality, globality and the identity strategies of 
nation branding consultants", International Journal of Communication, Vol. 2, pp. 41-65. 
Baldacchino, G. (2010a) "Island brands and the island as a brand: insights from immigrant 
entrepreneurs on Prince Edward Island", International Journal of Entrepreneurship & Small 
Business, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 378-393. 
Baldacchino, G. (2010b) ‘Editorial: The Island Lure’, International Journal of Entrepreneurship 
& Small Business, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 373-377. 
29 
 
Baldacchino, G. (2006) 'Innovative development strategies from non sovereign island 
jurisdictions? A global review of economic policy and governance practices', World 
Development, Vol. 34, No. 5, pp. 852-867. 
Baldacchino, G. (2005a) 'Successful small scale manufacturing from small islands: comparing 
firms benefiting from local raw material input', Journal of Small Business & 
Entrepreneurship, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 21‐38. 
Baldacchino, G. (2005b) 'Island entrepreneurs: insights from exceptionally successful 
knowledge‐driven SMEs from 5 European island territories', Journal of Enterprising 
Culture, Vol. 13, No. 2, pp.145‐170. 
Briguglio, L., Cordina, G., Vella, S. and Vigilance, C. (eds) (2010) Profiling Vulnerabilities and 
Resilience: A Manual for Small States, Commonwealth Secretariat: London. 
Briguglio, L. (1995) 'Small island developing states and their economic vulnerabilities', World 
Development, Vol. 23, No. 9,  pp.1615-163.  
Brown, A.D. and Starkey, K. (2000) 'Organizational identity and learning: a psychodynamic 
perspective',  Academy of Management Review, Vol. 25,  pp.102-21. 
Desai, M.A., Foley, C.F., Hines, J.R. (2006) "Do tax havens divert economic activity?", 
Economic Letters, Vol. 90, pp. 219-224. 
Dharmapala, D. and Hines, J. (2006) "Which countries become tax havens?", NBER Work Paper 
Series, available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w12802, last accessed 08/03/2014. 
Erdem, T. and Sun, B. (2002) 'An empirical investigation of the spillover effect of advertising 
and sales promotion in umbrella branding', Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. 39, No. 
4, pp. 408:420. 
30 
 
European Parliament (2013) European Initiatives on Eliminating Tax Havens and Offshore 
Financial Transactions and the Impact of these Constructions on the Union's own 
Resources and Budget, Directorate General for Internal Policies, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/cont/dv/staes_study/stae
s_studyen.pdf, last accessed: 08/03/2014.  
Fan, Y. (2010) 'Branding the nation: towards a better understanding', Place Branding and Public 
Diplomacy, Vol. 6, pp.97-103. 
Gravelle, J. (2013) Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, CRS Report for 
Congress, https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40623.pdf, last accessed 08/03/2014. 
Grydehøj, A. (2008) ‘Branding from above: generic cultural branding in Shetland and other 
islands’, Island Studies Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 175-198. 
Grovers, R. and Go, F.M. (2009) Place Branding: Glocal, Virtual, and Physical Identities, 
Constructed, Imagined, and Experienced, Palgrave McMillan: Basingstoke, Hampshire. 
Hampton, M., Christensen, J. (2002) 'Offshore pariahs? Small island economies, tax havens, and 
the re-configuration of global finance', World development, Vol.  30, No. 9:, pp.1657-
1673. 
Hausmann , R. and Rodrik, D. (2003) Economic development as self‐discovery.  Journal of 
Development Economics, Vol. 72, No. 2, pp.603‐633. 
Hong, Q. and Smart, M. (2007) 'In praise of tax havens: international tax planning and foreign 
direct investment', CESifo working paper, No. 1942, available athttp://www.cesifo-
group.de/portal/page/portal/DocBase_Content/WP/WP-CESifo_Working_Papers/wp-
cesifo-2007/wp-cesifo-2007-03/cesifo1_wp1942.pdf, last accessed 08/03/2014. 
31 
 
Isle of Man Government (2006) Economic and Social Development through the Enhancement of 
the National Identity of the Isle of Man: the Branding Project Report, Report 016/06. 
Jansen, S. C. (2008) "Designer nations: Neo-liberal nation branding- Brand Estonia", Social 
Identities, Vol. 14, No. 1, pp. 121-142. 
Johnson, H. (2012) "Genuine Jersey: branding and authenticity in a small island culture', Island 
Study Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 235-258. 
Leseure. M. (2010),  “Exploration versus exploitation in island economies: a brand diagnostic 
perspective”, International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small Business, Special 
Issue on Island Brands and Island Branding, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 463-480. 
March, J. (1991) 'Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning', Organization Science, 
Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 71-87.  
MacKrell, R. (2013) A New Framework: The Sociotechnical Approach to Nation Branding, 
Unpublished PhD Thesis, Liverpool John Moores University: UK. 
Marney, J.P. and Tarbert, F.E. (2000) "Why do simulations?  Towards a working espitemology 
for practioners of the dark arts", Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 
Vol. 3, No. 4, available at http://www.jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk. 
OECD (2014) List of Unco-operative Tax Havens, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/countries/monaco/listofunco-operativetaxhavens.htm, last accessed 
08/03/2014. 
Papodopoulos, N. and Heslop, L. (2002) "Country equity and country branding: Problems and 
prospects", Brand Management, Vol. 9, No. 4/5, pp. 294-314. 
Railsback, S., Lytinen, S., and Jackson, S. (2006) 'Agent-based platforms: review and 
development recommendations', Simulation, Vol. 82, pp. 609-623. 
32 
 
Rodriguez, S. and Child, J.  (2008) 'The development of a corporate identity: a political 
perspective',  Journal of Management Studies, No. 45, No. 5, pp. 885-911. 
Tan, C.T. and Farley, J., U. (1987) "The impact of cultural patterns on cognition and intention in 
Singapore", Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 13, pp. 540-544. 
Acknowledgements 
The comments of two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged to have contributed to 







Ideal economic identity (0 1 1 0) 
Independent 
Thinking (1) 

















(1 1 1 1) 
m1,1 = 0 m1,2 = 1 m1,3 = -1 m1,4 = 0 
Manx Core 
Population 
(1 0 0 1) 
m2,1 = 1 m2,2 = 0 m2,3 = 0 m2,4 = 0 
Other residents 
(-1 -1 -1 0) 
m3,1 = -1 m1,2 =1 m3.3 = 1 m3,4 =- 1 
Outsiders 
(-1 1 -1 1) 




p1= 0.5; p2= 0.5 yield (-1 1 1 1) and neighbouring values 
p1= 0.2; p2= 0.8 yield (-0.7 0.8 0.8 1) and neighbouring values 






p1= 0.5; p2= 0.5 yield (-1 0.5 0.8 0 ) and neighbouring values 
p1= 0.2; p2= 0.8 yield (-0.7 0.8 1 0.1 ) and neighbouring values 
p1= 0.8; p2= 0.2 yield (-1 1 1 0 ) and neighbouring values 
(some rare occasions where convergence is not achieved) 









Ideal economic identity (1 1 1 1) 














position can go 
















(1 -1 1 1) 
m1,1 =1 m1,2 = -1 m1,3 = 1 m1,4 = -1 
International 
Investors 
(0 0 0 0) 
m2,1 = 0 M2,2 = -1 m2,3 = -1 m2,4 = 0 
International 
organisations 
(0 1 1 1 ) 
m3,1 = -1 m1,2 =1 m3.3 = 1 m3,4 =1 
Media and the 
general public 
(0 0 1 0) 




p1= 0.5; p2= 0.5 yield (1 -1 1 1) 
p1= 0.2; p2= 0.8 yield (1- 1 1 1) 





p1= 0.5; p2= 0.5 yield (1 1 1 1) and converges systematically 
p1= 0.2; p2= 0.8 yield (1 1 1 1) and neighbouring values 
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Table 2. The Isle of Man International Tax Personality Simulation. 
 
